Who are the ‘others’? Mixed migration on the Eastern Mediterranean route

According to UNHCR figures some 1,089 people arrived to Greece by sea in February 2017. This marks a significant decrease from the more than 57,000 arrivals reported in February 2016 on the Eastern Mediterranean route.

The proportion of Syrians using this route is similarly declining in comparison to other nationalities arriving in Greece. In 2015, Syrians made up 56% of the 856,723 refugees and other migrants who arrived by boat in Greece, while in 2016 they comprised 47% of the 173,450 person total for that year. The numbers continued to decline in 2017, and as of February, Syrians made up only 40% of total arrivals (2,482 people) in Greece.

Meanwhile, the category of ‘others’ represented only 16.1% of total arrivals in Greece in September 2016, according to UNHCR’s Greece Data Snapshots. Yet by the first two months of 2017, 37% of arrivals in Greece were attributed to ‘other’ nationalities (i.e. not Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan, Pakistani, or Algerian).[1]

Source: UNHCR Operational Portal: Mediterranean Situation – Greece (Greece Data Snapshots)

As the proportion of Syrians has declined, the category of ‘others’ has been increasing: but who are these others?

In its publicly released data, UNHCR indicates a category of ‘other’ non-specified nationalities that includes all nationals of countries other than Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Algeria.[2] [3] The Turkish Coast Guard lists Syrian, Congolese, Pakistani, Afghan, Cameroonian, Eritrean, Malian, Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi as the top apprehended nationalities in February, while IOM figures for January, indicate the top five nationalities arriving by sea in Greece were Syrian, Algerian, Congolese, Iraqi, and Kuwaiti. These sources give us an indication of the various nationalities that may be arriving in Greece, but the category of ‘other’ remains opaque.

The increasing proportion of ‘other’ nationals received by Greece reflects the shifting nature and mixed usage of the Eastern Mediterranean Route. Limited information about these ‘other’ groups make trends difficult to discern, particularly as the movements of some nationalities along this route may be more sporadic than others. For example, while the number of Pakistanis arriving in Greece dropped by nearly 83% between December and January, and Algerian arrivals dropped by 80% between January and February, other nationalities are using this route more frequently. For example the number of Turkish nationals claiming asylum in Greece has been on the rise since an attempted coup in July, with some 236 individuals reportedly claiming asylum in Greece between July and February. IOM’s report that people from Republic of Congo were the third largest group of arrivals in January may similarly indicate a growing trend in this nationality’s usage of the Eastern Mediterranean Route, though limited data make such a trend difficult to confirm.

The demographic breakdown, particularly by nationality, of those arriving by sea in Greece is shifting from month to month. This means that the protection needs and vulnerabilities of the arriving population are shifting too. If we are to better tailor humanitarian responses to the specific needs of vulnerable groups, organisations and agencies tasked with monitoring and registering arrivals need to better differentiate who is who in mixed migration flows. The category of ‘others’ is not enough.

For more information on this and other mixed migration issues in the Middle East, please access MMP’s February Mixed Migration Summary (available here).



[1] These figures are slightly different from those represented  on the main page of UNHCR’s operational portal for Greece which reports on arrivals from Iran, but not Algeria, though the portal similarly indicates that ‘other’ groups comprised 36% of sea arrivals in Greece in January and February.

[2] Though Iran is included on the main page of the UNHCR Operational Portal: Mediterranean Situation – Greece.

[3] Some figures are available for a small number of Somali and Eritrean arrivals in 2015 though not in 2016 or 2017.


Numbers Matter: The Challenges of Inconsistent Data on Displacement and Migration

At the end of 2015, some 65.3 million people had been forcibly displaced worldwide, 39% of them from the Middle East or North Africa. With numbers likely higher in 2016, protecting the displaced remains an important and ongoing issue. Why then are accurate and consistent figures regarding refugees, asylum seekers, and other migrants often so difficult to find?

In a recent opinion piece, Paul Currion, a former aid worker, argues that “without knowing the numbers, it is impossible to make the right decisions about how to respond, with policy or in practice”. Understanding the scale of displacement, and those affected by it, is imperative to the provision of appropriate aid and policy responses. Yet “the numbers” are not always accurate, when they are available to policy makers and humanitarian groups at all.

A case in point came in 2015 when Nando Sigona, Deputy Director of the Institute for Research into Superdiversity at the University of Birmingham, noted major discrepancies in the EU’s migrant arrival figures for the first nine months of 2015. FRONTEX claimed that as of September, some 710,000 refugees and other migrants had crossed the EU’s external borders in 2015, an “unprecedented inflow of people”. These figures were significantly higher than those reported by the UN (588,247 arrivals from January to October) and IOM (593,432 through 12 October), a fact later explained by FRONTEX’s admission that people had been double counted if they crossed multiple EU borders.

Similar issues abound when it comes to collecting data on children and young people on the move in Europe. Differing definitions of children travelling alone in Europe, and diverse methods of counting those who fall under particular definitions, have led to inconsistencies when comparing the number of unaccompanied minors in various countries. EU member states differ in their national definitions of ‘unaccompanied minor’ especially with respect to age and what it means to be ‘unaccompanied’. Additionally, some countries include all people who claim to be unaccompanied minors (without age assessments) in their statistics, while others only include those whose age has been confirmed. In Spain, data is provided in distinct formats in various regions, while the four nations of the UK all collect and publish statistics in different ways. Double counting of unaccompanied minors is reportedly common in Italy, where children may be recorded by more than one local authority at the same time as the pass through various cities and regions, mainly a result of limited coordination between databases.

The impetus for this blog came from difficulties faced by MMP when collecting data for the December Monthly Migration Summary (available here). Escalating violence in Mosul and the surrounding areas in October, November, and December has forced some thousands of Iraqis to flee across the Syrian border, and in particular to the Al-Hol refugee camp in Al-Hasakeh governorate. Available figures for people affected by this displacement, however, vary considerably and paint an unclear picture of the situation. According to UNHCR, as of 31 December, 6,204 Iraqis have fled to Syria from Mosul since 17 October, while WFP figures indicate the number is closer to 12,000. Al Jazeera goes further still, reporting that 14,000 Iraqis crossed the Syrian border from Mosul in the span of a month. At worst, these inconsistencies may have profound implications for policy and aid decisions concerning the protection of vulnerable and displaced people, while at best they make it difficult to understand the precise magnitude of the situation, and to calculate the number of people fleeing.

The issue of data consistency and reliability is a difficult one that will require innovative approaches and collaborative efforts to address. Currion acknowledges that there are valid reasons for flawed data and inaccurate numbers including practical obstacles that accompany data collection on mobile populations, as well as methodological questions regarding exactly who to count and where. Data on displaced populations may also be highly politicised when, for example, it is in the interest of a government to downplay or exaggerate a crisis. These obstacles represent a unique opportunity for data sharing and collaboration between humanitarian organisations, governments, the media, and other relevant groups. With displacement in the Middle East as complex and protracted as it is, reliable and consistent information is imperative to creating policy and aid responses that meet the protection needs of all vulnerable people on the move.

This is the first in an ongoing series of blogs on the theme ‘Numbers Matter’. 


No way in, no way out: Apprehensions raise significant protection concerns along Turkey’s southern border

Up to 16,000 people have been displaced from Aleppo since government forces began a “renewed push” into the eastern part of the city on 15 November. Many have fled north towards the border with Turkey, and more can be expected as the fighting intensifies. They join an estimated 100,000 people already stranded on the Syrian side of the border. While international attention continues to focus on refugees and migrants entering, or attempting to enter, EU countries from Turkey, less consideration is given to the thousands of people trying to enter Turkey itself. Despite limited attention towards arrivals at the Turkish border, the number of people apprehended entering Turkey irregularly in October far exceeded the number who left in the same way.

Almost 100,000 people were reportedly apprehended along the Turkish borders with Syria and Iraq in September and October alone. By comparison, the Turkish Coast Guard reported only 2,437 ‘irregular migrants’ leaving Turkey and attempting the crossing to Europe in October, a figure 94.2% smaller than the number apprehended entering the country by land in the same month.

Disproportionate attention to refugees crossing to Greece and limited information about the number of people who manage to cross Turkey’s land borders undetected risks ignoring a large group of potentially vulnerable refugees and other migrants, who in many ways are invisible to the media and public eye. While Turkish officials claim that the country maintains an ‘open door’ policy for emergency situations, the land border has been effectively closed since March 2015, with strict visa requirements for Syrians entering Turkey by air or sea making it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to cross legally. While critical medical cases are being admitted through the two official border crossings that remain open with Syria, at most only 200 people are allowed entry per day – a fraction of the number apprehended by border guards when trying to cross irregularly.

Reports of violence, abuse, and deaths at the Turkey-Syria border only heighten concerns for the protection of people attempting to enter Turkey whilst fleeing conflict in Syria and Iraq, although the Turkish government maintains that claims of violence “do not reflect the reality at the border.

Refugees and other migrants must also contend with the wall being constructed along Turkey’s 900km border with Syria – 200km of which has already been constructed. This project has a completion date of February 2017 and aims to fence off the entire border.

Figure 5: Individuals apprehended by Turkish authorities in October 2016

Syrians face physical and legal barriers to escape in other directions too. With an estimated 85,000 Syrians stuck at Syria’s border with Jordan, and strict visa requirements blocking the passage of refugees into Lebanon, exiting Syria has become an almost impossible task.

Nonetheless, it must be assumed that many do manage to flee into Turkey and onwards, with 2,970 refugees and other migrants arriving in Greece by sea in October alone. The 100,000 people apprehended by Turkish border guards throughout September and October make up just part of the total flow of refugees and other migrants entering Turkey irregularly.

Increased border restrictions often lead to irregular movements of people across borders, accompanied by increased risks for people on the move. IOM’s data shows that the number of people reporting experiences of trafficking or other exploitative practices along the Eastern Mediterranean route has increased from 6.5% in May, to 14% in September, a change likely tied to the closure of the Western Balkans route and the implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement. Reported experiences include people being held against their will by non-governmental authorities (often smugglers), forced labour, and lack of payment for work throughout the journey to Europe.

In the same way, hidden, or ignored, people moving irregularly into Turkey likely face significant vulnerability and protection concerns, which need further and immediate attention.

For more information on this and other mixed migration issues in the Middle East, please access the Mixed Migration Platform’s October Mixed Migration Summary (accessible here).